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RAND AND THE AUSTRIANS: THE ULTIMATE VALUE 
AND THE NONINTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE 
KATHLEEN TOUCHSTONE* 
Introduction   
IN PART I, I review some of the literature on areas of agreement between 
the Austrian school and Objectivism. One point of contention is Ayn Rand’s 
justification for life as man’s ultimate value. In Part II, I discuss some of the 
ways in which my views depart from Objectivism. I present a case that the 
recognition of death’s inevitability is needed to establish life as man’s ultimate 
value. In addition, I discuss a desert-island scenario that supports the 
noninterference principle. 
Part I 
Here I review some of the literature on the points of agreement between 
Objectivist and Austrian thought as well as some points of departure. Austrian 
philosophy is largely identified with economics, which is a value-free discipline. 
Terms such as “value” and “happiness” have no normative content in 
economics (Mises [1949] 1996, 242). Yet, to Austrian economist Ludwig von 
Mises praxeology, which includes economics, is a moral science because it is 
the study of action, which “is a manifestation of the mind” ([1949] 1996, 142). 
Similarly, to Ayn Rand all decisions are moral decisions, according to Ronald 
Merrill (1997, 69–70). Both disciplines examine decision-making and behavior; 
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nevertheless, economics and ethics investigate what “is” and what “should be,” 
respectively. 
Austrian economists, such as Mises and Murray N. Rothbard, have taken 
an ab initio approach to theory—a method Rothbard also used in his ethics of 
liberty (i.e., rights). Rand also used this approach in ethics. One difference 
between Rand and Mises (and between Rand and other philosophers as well) 
is Rand’s epistemology—one with which Rothbard agreed, at least in large 
measure. In fact, Rothbard is credited as going a long way toward bridging the 
gap between the Objectivists and Austrians (Younkins 2005, 367). 
In his ethics, however, Friedrich A. Hayek advanced an evolutionary 
rather than an ab initio approach. Evolutionary ethicism has also been adopted 
by rule utilitarians Henry Hazlitt and Leland B. Yeager (Hayek 1973, 43–48; 
Hazlitt 1998, 72; Yeager 2001, 77). Yeager, although not an Austrian, is, like 
Rothbard, also credited with reconciling Objectivism and Austrian thought 
(Long 2005, 313n18). 
Subjective/Objective 
One reason the terms “subjective” and “objective” are important is 
because they relate to the concept of value. The term “value” has normative 
significance in ethics but is ostensibly free of ethical content from the 
economist’s perspective. Economists often make certain implicit assumptions 
about property rights and voluntary interaction that carry normative 
implications, but they typically take so-called “tastes and preferences” (which 
include norms) as given (Hazlitt 1998, 160). Unlike ethicists such as Rand, 
economists are typically unconcerned with values (ends) per se. As an ethicist, 
Rand’s concern was with how things should be valued. Economists are 
interested in how goods and services are valued. 
According to Objectivist Leonard Peikoff, subjectivism in the 
metaphysical realm views reality as dependent on consciousness. In the 
epistemological sphere, it advances the notion that the source of truth is a 
person’s feelings. Feelings serve as man’s means of cognition. Objectivism, on 
the other hand, regards reality as independent of man’s consciousness: “The 
role of the subject is not to create the object, but to perceive it… knowledge 
of reality can be acquired only by directing one’s attention outward to the facts” 
(Peikoff 1982, 62). 
On a key point, there is little difference in the ways in which Objectivists 
view “objective” and Austrians interpret “subjective.” Austrians and 
Objectivists view value as being a relationship between a valuer (individual) 
and that which is valued (something that exists in reality) (Johnsson 2005, 320–
21; Hazlitt 1998, 162). Austrian economists, like most economists, conceive of 
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economic value in terms of utility to economic actors. The term “subjective,” 
at least in some contexts, means “personal” in the economist’s lexicon. The 
value attached to a good or service by individuals determines the market value 
of a good or service. This is the prevailing view as opposed to the labor (input) 
theory of value, which was labeled “objective.” 
Edward W. Younkins views Mises as a strict subjectivist in that Mises 
saw value as derived from the consciousness of the individual valuer. Mises 
regarded value as dependent upon an individual’s “personal assessment of the 
choices available” (Younkins 2005, 352; see Mises [1949] 1966, 181–85). 
According to Richard C.B. Johnsson, even though Mises is considered a 
“value-subjectivist,” his subjectivism “is not the sort to which Rand need 
object” (2005, 308). 
According to Younkins, “the term ‘subjective’ as used by [Austrian 
economist Carl] Menger simply means ‘personal’—as in a personal evaluation 
by a specific individual living in a particular time and place, with specific wants 
and needs” (2005, 350).1 Menger’s view of subjective as being synonymous 
with personal appears to be similar to Mises’s view; however, according to 
Younkins, Mises considered Menger’s Aristotelian approach too embedded in 
concrete reality. Mises “wanted to escape from the concrete-based 
propagandistic empiricism of historicism” (2005, 341). On the issue of value, 
Younkins finds a closer connection between Rand and Menger than between 
Rand and Mises because of Menger’s linking of value (ends) to human nature 
(2005, 347, 351). 
According to Younkins: 
Menger understood that values can be subjective, but that men should 
rationally seek objective life-affirming values. He explained that real 
wants correspond with the objective state of affairs. Menger 
distinguished between real and imaginary wants depending upon 
whether or not a person correctly understands a good’s objective 
ability to satisfy a want. Individuals can be wrong about their 
judgment of value. (2005, 351) 
Younkins further states that 
                                                          
1 Younkins notes it was because the labor theory of value had long been given the 
appellation of the “objective” theory of value that Menger’s theory was referred to as 
“subjective” (2005, 350). He also points out that Mises reinterpreted Menger’s theory as a 
theory of subjective value. The confusion was further compounded when Max Weber 
rephrased “Menger’s theory of subjective value” as “Menger’s subjective theory of value” 
thereby “switching the subjectivity from an individual’s values to the province of the 
theoretical perspective of a given historian, sociologist, or scientist” (2005, 353). 
172 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 7 (2), (2015) 
values are not subjective, arbitrary, or intrinsic but are objective when 
a person’s wants correspond to the objective state of affairs. Menger 
understood that the process of want satisfaction is not entirely 
cognitive and internal to the human mind, but dependent upon the 
external world and upon the law of cause and effect. For value to exist 
there must be a connection in reality grasped by consciousness with 
respect to means and ends that support a particular man’s life. (2005, 
349–50) 
Writing from a broader perspective than solely economic, Hayek 
developed an evolutionary ethics (Hayek 1973, 43–48). Rule utilitarian Henry 
Hazlitt, also a proponent of evolutionary ethics, identifies the personal with 
the subjective, stating, “All valuation is in origin necessarily subjective” (Hazlitt 
1998, 162). According to Hazlitt (1998, 164), market prices are socially formed 
and objective. He regards societal norms as objective as well. He views them 
as having moral force and deserving of adherence (1998, 165), with 
qualifications. Rand also views market values as being objective; however, 
unlike Hazlitt, she regards ethical values as based objectively on man’s nature 
(1961, 120–21). This is basically the same view as Rothbard’s. Rothbard 
employs the word “objective” to mean “determined by the natural law of man’s 
being” (1998, 12). He based his ethics of liberty (i.e., rights) on natural law. 
According to Barbara Branden (1986, 413), “Rand convinced [Rothbard] of 
the theory of natural rights” (quoted in Sciabarra and Sechrest 2005, 243). 
However, far from dispensing with happiness, Rothbard regards natural law as 
“the science of happiness.” His theory could be considered an extension of 
utilitarianism in that respect (1998, 12). According to Younkins, Rothbard for 
the most part agreed with Objectivism. In fact, Rothbard is credited with 
bridging many of the differences between Objectivism and the Austrian school 
(Younkins 2005, 367). Thus, within some contexts, there is a good deal of 
agreement between Objectivists and Austrians on the terms subjective and 
objective. Both regard “subjective” as denoting “personal” and “objective” as 
meaning “socially determined,” although neither school limits the terms to 
these usages.2 
                                                          
2 To clarify, according to Rand, “Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an 
epistemological concept. It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. 
Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any 
perceiver’s consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a 
perceiver’s (man’s) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means 
(reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic)” (Rand 1965, 7). 
Rand distinguished socially objective values from philosophically objective values as 
follows: market values do “not necessarily represent their philosophically objective value, 
but only their socially objective value, i.e., the sum of the individual judgments of all the men 
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A priori 
A priori propositions are “self-evident”—that is, they “are not derived 
from experience… [and] are not subject to verification or falsification on the 
ground of experience or facts” (Mises [1949] 1996, 32; quoted in Johnsson 
2005, 328). A priori propositions abstract from time and place. They are 
attained via “pure reason,” by which Mises means they are not acquired by 
human perception of the material world (Johnsson 2005, 328, 330, 342). 
According to Younkins, Mises believed a priori propositions are arrived at by 
introspection and prior to “all experience” (2005, 342, 344). However, 
according to George Reisman, Mises’s a priori propositions are not prior to all 
experience whatsoever, but prior to a sufficient, albeit small, amount of 
experience required for their establishment as truths (Reisman 2005, 257n7). 
This is in keeping with the current view of philosophers, according to Peikoff 
(1990, 93). The principles thus acquired are “laws of thought” as opposed to 
“laws of reality” (Johnsson 2005, 328). However, the propositions can be 
regarded as realistic rather than idealistic, once it is acknowledged the mental 
world is connected to physical reality via human action (Younkins 2005, 342). 
Rand rejects a priori reasoning because she regards all knowledge as 
reality-based. The connection between thought and reality as expressed above 
would be far too tenuous for her to accept. Roderick Long points out that 
Rand’s conception of axioms is essentially the same as that which is typically 
called a priori by philosophers; axioms are validated “by showing them to be 
presupposed in their very denials” (2005, 303). Even so, Rand would not call 
such axioms a priori since to her axioms “identify facts that are ultimately 
grasped via perceptual experience” (2005, 304). Long notes that Rothbard’s 
view of axioms is more in line with Rand than is Mises’s, in that Rothbard 
thought axioms were experience-based. Nonetheless, Rothbard referred to 
axioms as a priori because of the connotation associated with the word 
“experience” fashioned by modern empiricists (2005, 304). 
The point of differentiation between Rand and not only Austrian 
economists but many other philosophers is her epistemology. A salient feature 
of Objectivism is that the essences on which concepts are based are not 
metaphysical realities, but epistemological in nature.3 This distinguishes her 
notion of concepts from that of Aristotle and Menger, and, according to 
Younkins, is arguably superior (2005, 369–70). 
                                                          
involved in trade at a given time, the sum of what they valued, each in the context of his 
own life” (1967, 24–25). 
3 According to an anonymous reviewer, by this “Rand actually meant contextual and 
relational.” 
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The acquisition of knowledge in Rand’s view is a conscious process of 
induction and deduction (2005, 369–70). To Rand, concepts are the building 
blocks of knowledge. A concept is formed by recognizing that two or more 
existents in reality share similar essential characteristics and integrating these 
existents into a single cognitive unit, which is given a specific definition (Rand 
1990, 10, 97–98). A concept is not confined to mean only the essences used in 
its formation. The meaning of a concept is the existents in reality on which it 
is based (1990, 94, 98). This is the link between epistemology and metaphysical 
reality. Because man is not omniscient, knowledge is open-ended. Concepts on 
which knowledge is based are likewise open-ended. It is this latter feature, the 
open-endedness of concepts, that most distinguishes Rand’s formulation of 
concepts from other views. 
Mises’s praxeology is based on the self-evident axiom that humans act 
(Johnsson 2005, 327). According to Younkins, categorizing the action axiom 
as a priori severs the connection between man’s consciousness and the external 
world. Younkins notes that basing Mises’s action axiom on concepts that are 
reality-based, as Rand’s are, would place Mises’s theory on a sounder 
epistemological footing. This is the case in part because derivative concepts 
can thereby be defended as products “of a relation between a subject and an 
object” (Younkins 2005, 370). 
Volition and Reason 
Although Rand views rationality as man’s distinguishing characteristic, 
she regards man as a being of “volitional consciousness”—meaning reason is 
undertaken by choice. Reason is not automatic: it takes effort, and it is not 
infallible. Mises, on the other hand, sees all of human action as rational, by 
which he means purposeful. According to Long, Mises means men act based 
on the best information they have at the moment in choosing “the most 
rationally defensible means to their ends” (Long 2005, 309; emphasis in 
original). Rand would not agree since she thinks men are capable of ignoring 
vital information (that is, “blanking out”) when making decisions (Peikoff 
1991, 61; Rand 1961, 176). She regards this act of ignoring as a moral lapse.4 
                                                          
4 Wrong actions can occur for many reasons. Because humans are fallible, they can 
reason to the best of their ability and still come up with flawed principles. They may apply 
a principle incorrectly; context matters. Since information is imperfect, they may act on 
faulty information. Morally wrong action is when a person “knows better.” It is when a 
person knows what the principle is but refuses to follow it for short-sighted gain, for 
instance. It is either that or because a person refuses to think. He ignores vital information 
of which he is aware but refuses to acknowledge in making a decision. Willfully acting 
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Generally speaking, economists assume decision-makers act rationally, 
but this conception of rationality is much narrower than that posed by Mises. 
For instance, in economics it is assumed that given two identical products, a 
consumer would choose the product with the lower price; or other things 
equal, given two identical jobs, a worker would choose the job with the higher 
pay. Mises’s logical progression is from observing that human action 
necessarily has a means-end structure (it is purposeful), which presumes cause 
and effect, which he equates with determinism. According to Long, once the 
cause-effect/determinism connection is unhooked (by Rand), Mises’s 
praxeology “no longer poses a threat to free will” (Long 2005, 309). Once 
volition is an acknowledged attribute of man, then Mises’s position on 
rationality can be recast as one consistent with Objectivism (Long 2005, 310). 
Nature 
Rand’s concern is with the nature of man, with which Rothbard was in 
basic agreement in his theory of rights (Sciabarra and Sechrest 2005, 243). 
“Nature of man” is not new to philosophy, of course. However, it has had its 
share of criticism. As Hazlitt points out, John Stuart Mill thought the notion 
“man ought to follow nature” (Hazlitt 1998, 203) had no meaning since man 
can do nothing else. Man’s actions must conform to nature’s laws—whether 
physical or mental. Mill also thought the idea man should pattern his actions 
after the spontaneous nature of things was irrational since man’s actions 
necessarily alter the spontaneous course of things, and in fact, such patterning 
was immoral because nature can be destructive and cruel (Hazlitt 1998, 203). 
According to Mises, “Nature is unfeeling and insensible with regard to any 
being’s life and happiness (Mises [1949]1996, 174). 
Rand would likely agree with Mises in that metaphysically she views the 
universe as indifferent to man. Of course, by “nature” Rand does not mean 
humans are to act in accordance with nature. The concept of human nature in 
ethics is normative (Rand 1961, 120–21). Rand’s objective was to discover the 
principles (virtues) by which man should act if he is to achieve his ends—life 
being the ultimate end (Rand 1964a, 22). 
Mises notes that “reason’s biological function is to preserve and to 
promote life and to postpone its extinction as long as possible. Thinking and 
acting are not contrary to nature; they are, rather, the foremost features of 
man’s nature” (Mises [1949] 1996, 882). Rand would probably agree with the 
spirit of Mises’s statement. However, as Lachlan Doughney points out, to 
                                                          
against principle or refusing to acknowledge information (blanking out, as Rand calls it) is 
“wrong” in the moral sense (Rand 1961, 127). 
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Rand, since man must discover (through a process of reason) a moral code and 
since his thoughts and actions are volitional, he can act counter to his “nature” 
(Doughney 2012, 161; Rand 1961, 121). 
Is-Ought 
Man “is,” and ethics provides a code of what man “ought” to do. In 
order to have a code of ethics, it is necessary to transition from “is” to “ought.” 
Yeager invokes David Hume in contending that an “ought” cannot be derived 
from an “is” based on facts alone. A person cannot argue for a fundamental 
value judgment; he “must appeal to direct observation or intuition” (Yeager 
2001, 288). Yeager identifies intuitions with (fundamental) value judgments 
(2001, 79). He does not believe a rational ethics is possible. He states, “[Ethical] 
propositions are not purely descriptive. They are neither purely factual 
statements nor logical tautologies nor some blend of the two alone. 
Observation and reasoning alone cannot validate them. No one can prove in a 
purely objective way, free of any trace of evaluation or intuition or emotion, 
that consideration and kindness are good and torture and murder are wrong” 
(2001, 18). A doctrine that “commits the fallacy of trying to get an ‘ought’ from 
an ‘is’” (2001, 203) would be one in which “ethical propositions have nothing 
but descriptive content” (2001, 203). 
Yeager has “both a spontaneous-evolution theory of the origin of morals 
and a utilitarian metaethical theory of how to assess them” (2001, 77). Like 
Yeager, Henry Hazlitt is a rule utilitarian and an evolutionary ethicist. Hazlitt 
states it is a fact that each man desires his own long-term happiness— it is an is 
statement (Hazlitt 1998, 13): “This is true if only because it is tautological. Our 
long-run happiness is merely another name for what we do in fact desire in the 
long run” (1998, 34; cf. Mises [1949] 1996, 154). The means of acquiring this, 
according to Hazlitt, is social cooperation (1998, 13; cf. Mises [1949] 1996, 
176). To Hazlitt, in order for individuals to attain their long-term happiness, 
they ought to follow the moral rules of society (1998, 13). In this way Hazlitt 
bridges the is/ought gap: “An ought is always based upon, and derived from, an 
is or a will be” (1998, 34). As Hazlitt sees it, “the is is the desire; the ought is the 
means of gratifying it” (1998, 12). Interestingly, he also says that “a rational 
ethics cannot be built merely on what we ‘ought’ to desire but on what we do 
desire” (1998, 34). He is not deriving an “ought” from an “is,” but an “is” from 
an “is.” 
Rand, however, claims to have derived ought from is. Although Yeager 
finds a good deal of concordance between his own views and those associated 
with Objectivism, he states that “agreement does not transform value 
judgments into positive propositions” (Yeager 2001, 24). Objectivist ethics 
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(OE) is biological and teleological. It is biological in that it starts, not with man, 
but with living beings in general. The concept “value” arises with the 
emergence of life. The life of a living being is contingent. A living entity 
constantly faces the alternative of life or death. In order to remain what it is—
a living being—it must “act” to sustain its survival. A value is defined as that 
which a living being acts to maintain or achieve (Rand 1964a, 15). Life is the 
value living beings act to preserve. This is an automatic process for lower-level 
beings. They automatically act to stay alive (1964a, 18–19). 
According to Rand, the ultimate end for which all of a living being’s 
actions are undertaken is its own survival. For her, 
without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goals or means: 
a series of means going off into an infinite progression toward a 
nonexistent end is a metaphysical and epistemological impossibility. 
It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself that makes the existence of 
values possible. (1964a, 7) 
What man is determines what he ought to do. Like other living creatures, 
humans also face the alternative of life and death, but unlike lower-level beings, 
humans have no automatic means of survival. They may have urges, such as 
hunger, but they must learn what is edible and what is not, how to hunt, how 
to cultivate, how to prepare food, and so on (1964a, 21). This requires reason 
and action. Humans must choose to live. Their means of survival is reason, 
and since it is not automatic, man must choose to think. The choice to think is 
the choice to survive (1964a, 20). Because humans are volitional by nature, they 
can make this choice (1964a, 21). It is because man faces the choice of existence 
or nonexistence that he needs a code of values (virtues). The actions man takes 
to sustain his existence are virtues. Because man is neither omniscient nor 
infallible, he must learn the right actions to take to sustain his existence. 
Life is the precondition for all things living. Without life, no other values 
are possible. Therefore, it must form the basis for a code of values. There is an 
alternative to life, namely, death. However, if death is the basis for a code of 
values, no actions are necessary; therefore no code is necessary (1964a, 16; 15). 
Rand and Is/Ought Continued 
In “Rand on Hume’s Moral Skepticism,” Tibor Machan argues Hume’s 
claim was that an “ought” cannot be deduced from an “is” (or “is” premises). 
However, Rand, according to Machan, did not deduce an ought from an is; she 
derived it (Machan 2008, 245–46). Doughney, on the other hand, claims Rand 
did think she deduced an ought from an is (or “is” premises). Doughney states 
that Rand “postulates an ultimate value… as a fact, as an ‘is’ statement about 
the world” (2012, 157; see also Mack 1986, 134). Doughney presents a 
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deductive argument that life is a value for human beings, which is based on 
Rand’s definition of value and her proposition that a rational being acts to 
achieve or keep his own life as a value (2012, 162). One of the sticking points 
is that both of these statements are analytic premises, and Rand rejected 
analytic propositions because they are a priori and therefore not reality-based 
(Peikoff 1990, 93). Doughney turns to Fred Seddon’s (2006) observation that 
Rand implicitly accepted analytic truths because her definition of an axiom is 
that which is commonly understood by the term “a priori” (Doughney 2012, 
167n4; Seddon 2006, 45). As has already been mentioned above, Roderick 
Long made a similar observation (Long 2005, 303); however, he also noted 
Rand regarded axioms as experience-based (2005, 304). Also previously noted 
was that Peikoff and Reisman pointed out a priori does not mean prior to all 
experience (Reismann 2005, 257n7; Peikoff 1990, 93). The open-endedness of 
concepts in Objectivist epistemology distinguishes Rand’s approach to axioms. 
As Machan points out, Rand would have no issue with “deduction” so long as 
it did not mean “logical arguments involving closed definitions” (Machan 2008, 
251n2). 
Eric Mack suggests that instead of interpreting Rand’s position as one of 
postulating life is a value, the alternative interpretation is to presume the weaker 
proposition “that there is some worthwhile end for the attainment of which 
guided action is necessary” (1986, 134; emphasis in original). According to 
Mack, if death is the basis for a code of values, no actions are necessary; 
therefore no code is necessary. As Rand observes, “In a fundamental sense, 
stillness is the antithesis of life. Life can be kept in existence only by a process 
of self-sustaining action” (Rand 1964a, 16). If an individual does not initiate 
any action at all, he will die (Mack, 1986, 134). It is the one thing that will result 
in death with certainty. As Mack notes, even random actions are “causally 
sufficient for death” (Mack, 1986, 134). Since only two alternatives 
fundamentally exist—life and death (Rand 1964, 15)—it follows life “is the 
goal worth being guided to” (Mack 1986, 134). (Note the latter case presented 
by Mack dovetails nicely with Misesian praxeology because of the crucial place 
of action in the argument. This tends to support Younkins’s contention that 
Objectivist epistemology could provide a sounder basis for Mises’s 
praxeology.) 
Eudaemonia 
In Yeager’s view, life is the precondition “for the holding of any values” 
(Yeager 2001, 23), but he also notes life is, after all, the precondition for misery 
as well (Yeager 2001, 23). When Rand refers to “life” she means “life qua man” 
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(1964a, 29).5 This is the teleological aspect of Rand’s ethics. What then would 
constitute a life qua man? A number of writers have addressed this aspect of 
OE, such as Machan and Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen (Younkins 
2005, 367; Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991; Machan 1989). They have 
categorized Rand’s notion of life qua man as the same one Aristotle referred 
to as eudaemonia (or what could be called “the good life”). The idea that man’s 
ultimate value is eudaemonia also seems to fit with the views of Hazlitt and 
Yeager (Hazlitt 1998, 21, 25–26, 33–34; Yeager 2001, 85), both of whom are 
rule utilitarians. 
The rule-utilitarian doctrine advances the idea that the standard for an 
ethical principle is whether it contributes to the success of individuals striving 
for “happiness, health and well-being” in the long run (Hazlitt 1998, 25; Yeager 
2001, 13). Although happiness is the criterion most associated with 
utilitarianism, the word is not adequate (Yeager 2001, 62). “Satisfaction with 
one’s life as a whole” is more accurate (2001, 85). Even though no one word 
is sufficient, Aristotle’s expression eudaemonia is a close equivalent (Hazlitt 1998, 
25; Yeager 2001, 62). Mises distinguishes between the formal usage of the word 
“happiness” in praxeology (and economics) and its concrete form within 
liberalism, which is synonymous with a life of health and prosperity. He further 
states it is not the liberal claim that people should strive for this goal, but that 
they do do so ([1949] 1996, 154). 
To Rand, happiness, which she defines as the response to achieving one’s 
values (1964a, 28), is a man’s “highest moral purpose” (1964a, 27; emphasis in 
original) and life’s reward (1961a, 131). Rand does not regard maintaining one’s 
life and happiness as separate achievements but as two aspects of the same 
thing: “Existentially, the activity of pursuing rational goals is the activity of 
maintaining one’s life; psychologically, its result, reward and concomitant is an 
emotional state of happiness” (1964a, 29). Rand does not think, however, that 
cause and effect can be reversed (1964a, 29). Yeager makes a similar claim. He 
states, “one no more achieves personal happiness by aiming directly at it than 
one reaches Boston by pointing the car in that direction and bulling straight 
ahead… [O]ne does not contribute most to general happiness by aiming 
directly at it” (2001, 95). 
Jack Wheeler points out that “happiness” does not translate to 
“eudaemonia” because the latter “is an activity not merely a state of mind” 
(Wheeler 1986, 87). Even so, in OE happiness is linked closely to productive 
work, and Ray Shelton contends that at some level Rand equates them 
                                                          
5 Life as the standard of value applies to man. The ultimate value—life qua man—
applies to every individual (Rand 1964a, 25). 
180 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 7 (2), (2015) 
(Shelton, 1995, 43n73).6 Mack maintains that in OE, happiness is not 
constitutive of an individual’s ultimate value. If it were, Rand’s position was 
that this would imply hedonistic motivation on the part of individuals (Mack 
1986, 136). Hazlitt and Yeager also stress that rule utilitarianism is not 
hedonism (Hazlitt 1998 17, 25; Yeager 2001, 85). Eudaemonia appears to 
capture what Mises is referring to as the goal toward which people strive as 
well as what rule utilitarians mean by “happiness” and Objectivists mean by 
“life qua man” when they refer to the ultimate value. 
Social Cooperation 
Although both Hazlitt and Yeager regard happiness (i.e., eudaemonia) to 
be the fundamental and ultimate value in their systems of ethics, both see social 
cooperation as the means by which this is achieved (Hazlitt 1998, 36; Yeager 
2001, 289). They attribute the origin of this idea to Mises and Hayek (Hazlitt 
1998, xiv; Yeager 2001, 13; Mises [1949] 1996, 176). Like Hayek (Horwitz 2005, 
386), Hazlitt regards an ideal ethical system as one promoting social 
cooperation. It results in the greatest satisfaction for the largest number of 
people (Hazlitt 1998, 127). By social cooperation, Hazlitt means the benefits 
arising from the division of labor (1998, 37), which, as Yeager points out, 
Hazlitt does not confine to the economic sphere but extends to everyday social 
interactions (Yeager 1998, xiv). Similarly, according to Mises, “Society is 
division and combination of labor” (Mises [1949] 1996, 143; quoted in 
Herbener 2005, 163). For him, “the division of labor is the essence of society 
and the linchpin of all civilization” (Herbener 2005, 163). This is tied directly 
to man’s life in the following: “Reason has demonstrated that, for man, the 
most adequate means of improving his condition is social cooperation and 
division of labor. They are man’s foremost tool in his struggle for survival” 
(Mises [1949] 1996, 176). However, Mises adds the qualification that they are 
successful when there is peace (Mises [1949] 1996, 176). 
Hazlitt regards social cooperation as the foundation on which to erect a 
rational moral code (1998, 14). According to Yeager, social cooperation is the 
fundamental value of Hazlitt’s ethical system, with the proviso that it is a proxy 
for happiness (that is, eudaemonia) (Yeager 1998, xiv). Hazlitt sees “little harm 
                                                          
6 Rand’s linking of happiness to one’s work or career is similar to David Norton’s 
notion of a person’s daimon or destiny (Norton 1976, 6). Den Uyl and Rasmussen find 
Norton gives fuller expression to Rand’s view of happiness (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1986, 
75). Norton also saw the link between individuals pursuing their respective destinies and 
specialization. However, a point of differentiation between Norton and Rand as well as 
Norton and the Austrians is that Norton disconnects specialization from exchange 
(Touchstone 2006, 224–25). This is a weakness, as I see it, in Norton’s ethics. 
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in regarding [social cooperation] as an end-in-itself, and even in treating it as if 
it were the goal of ethics” (Hazlitt 1998, 36). 
The trader principle is the central social principle in OE. Rand defines it 
as the exchange of value for value between independent adults. It extends 
beyond the economic sphere to include communication, friendship, and 
romantic love. In essence, it is social cooperation. However, although Rand, 
like Mises, is aware of the mutual gains from trade via the division of labor, her 
emphasis is on the voluntary nature of the exchange (Rand 1964a, 32). Rand 
identifies the trader principle with the principle of justice (1964a, 31). Hazlitt, 
on the other hand, regards “justice” as the observance of social rules that 
maintain and promote social cooperation in the long term (1998, 13). He sees 
social cooperation as enormously voluntary in the main (1998, 44). 
Part II 
In Part I, I examined some points of intersection between Objectivism 
and the Austrian school, primarily in the realm of ethics. In Part II, I return to 
the idea that life is the ultimate value and why I think relying on life’s 
contingency is an incomplete justification for that argument. I then provide a 
two-man desert-island abstraction and present a case supporting the 
noninterference principle insofar as one’s person is concerned. I also discuss 
respect for property based on the disincentive of physical reprisal. 
Rand’s Indestructible Robot and the Ultimate Value 
In this and the next four sections, I consider the question of life as the 
ultimate value. I agree with Rand that life’s contingency is essential in 
establishing life as a value. However, I do not think it is sufficient to 
substantiate life as the ultimate value. The essential ingredient required to 
establish life as the ultimate value is its finiteness. However, its finality is not 
sufficient in itself. It is because man is aware he will die and is cognizant of his 
potential lifespan that life is his ultimate value.7 
Rand argues life is the fundamental value in her code of ethics. It is also 
the ultimate value. Similarly, Hazlitt and Yeager view eudaemonia as the 
fundamental and the ultimate value. Rand’s reason is not the same as either 
                                                          
7 For infants and young children, life may be the ultimate value in the metaphysical 
sense but not from an ethical perspective. At most, infants and young children have a 
rudimentary sense of “life” and lack the experiential and cognitive capacity to have a 
concept of death. Ethical standards that apply to adults do not apply to young children 
because they do not have a fully functioning rational capacity. 
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Hazlitt’s or Yeager’s. Her claim is that life’s contingency renders it the 
fundamental (and the ultimate) value. This is the case not only for man but for 
all living beings. Life makes values possible. A value is defined as that which 
one acts to achieve or maintain (Rand 1964a, 15). Life is described as “a process 
of self- sustaining and self-generated action” (1961, 121). To illustrate her 
point, Rand uses the thought experiment of an indestructible, immortal robot. 
To such an entity, values would be impossible (1964a, 15). 
There have been a number of critics of Rand’s Indestructible Robot 
thought experiment. Rand posited it as an entity that could not die, either 
through accidents or aging. Rand’s contention was that for such a being no 
values would be possible. According to Leonard Peikoff, “Goal directed 
entities do not exist to pursue values. They pursue values in order to exist” 
(1991, 211). The fundamental alternative, “to be or not to be,” is the “value-
generating alternative” (1991, 211). 
J. Charles King asked if this robot could have desires. If not, then the 
argument is uninteresting. If it is assumed the robot cannot be affected in any 
way, then it “either does not know or does not care what happened to things 
around it” (King 1984, 109; quoted in Touchstone 1993, 5). David Brown 
asked, even if it is assumed the robot has no physical needs to satisfy, would 
this “preclude artistic or cerebral pursuits?” (1992, 63). 
I addressed the question of aesthetic pursuits in “Can Art Exist without 
Death?” I considered the possibility of whether art would be a value to such 
an entity. My answer was “yes, if”—that is, if it is assumed the entity possesses 
“at least some aspects of man’s psychological make-up” (1993, 24). The 
Randian robot is assumed to have a perceptual faculty in that it knows it exists, 
but it is inert. It appears to be the case that for the Randian robot, “without a 
biological disturbance to motivate action, no other action is possible” (1993, 
20). According to drive theory, an organism is inert unless there is a biological 
disturbance. This, according to Tibor Scitovksy, was an inherent flaw of drive 
theory, since it is now recognized “that nerve cells fire spontaneously and the 
central nervous system is always active” (1977, 17; quoted in Touchstone 1993, 
20). 
Scitovsky (1977, 31) further noted that “psychologists regard stimulus 
deprivation, or its milder form, boredom, as a condition motivating action” 
(1993, 21). Biological disturbances “are relieved by engaging in an activity to 
satisfy a particular need” (1993, 21). However, “boredom is general and can be 
escaped through a great variety of activities” (Scitovsky 1977, 31; quoted in 
Touchstone 1993, 21). These might include “recreation, entertainment, 
spectator sports, games, art, philosophy, satisfaction of scientific and idle 
RAND AND THE AUSTRIANS 183 
curiosity, and any other mental activity undertaken not to fill a need, but to 
avoid boredom” (1977, 32). 
Peikoff asks why a robot with a conceptual faculty would need recreation 
since he would need no rest. Rest from what? (1991, 210). According to 
Scitovsky, these activities are not undertaken as a rest from others (at least not 
exclusively) but to relieve boredom brought on by lack of stimulation. 
Although he notes that even activities undertaken strictly for pleasure are 
related to survival, he later acknowledges enjoyment of art is not related to a 
threat to survival. He thus transforms the idea of “threat” to “resolving a 
problem” (1977, 42; Touchstone 1993, 21–22). Although lack of stimulation 
may be one psychologically based motivation for undertaking actions that 
could include aesthetic and other pursuits, it need not be the only one. 
Nevertheless, it does provide at least one possible justification for such 
endeavors, even for an immortal entity with no possibility of death so long as 
the entity possessed at least the associated aspect of man’s conceptual make-
up. 
Gennady Stolyarov (2008) views Rand’s robot as one of her least 
defensible arguments. Because of biomedical advances, human lifespans may 
allow for an indefinite existence. This possibility would not transform humans 
into indestructible robots because they would still be subject to biological decay 
if untreated as well as vulnerable to death from accidents. Even an 
indestructible robot could have values and a motivation for pursuing them as 
long as it had human perceptual and cognitive abilities. As Stolyarov argues, 
the fear of death is not the (only) motivation for human behavior. The primary 
motivation is achieving life, according to Rand. By “achieving life,” 
Objectivists and Neo-Objectivists mean “flourishing.” Stolyarov states, “even 
if death were not a possibility for such a being, it could still pursue and enjoy 
art, music, inventions, games—any activity that is appealing from the 
perspective of the senses, the intellect, or the general civilizing project of 
transforming chaos into order and transforming simpler orders into more 
complex ones” (Stolyarov 2008; see also Andrix 2006). 
Life—A Value 
As for mortal man, what distinguishes him from other living creatures is 
he must choose life as a value. Life or death is the fundamental alternative. This 
alternative involves a choice because man has volition. Because choice is 
involved a code of ethics is necessary. A virtue is an action by which one 
acquires or maintains a value. Life is a fundamental (foundational) value 
because without life no other values are possible. It is a precondition for all 
other values. The alternative to life is death. A code of ethics with death as its 
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basis would be unnecessary because to achieve death no action is required. As 
I see it, this line of reasoning may establish life as foundational or fundamental, 
but it does not establish it an ultimate value. 
According to Rand, man’s life is also the standard of value, by which she 
means life is “a gauge to guide a man’s choices in the achievement of a 
concrete, specific purpose” (1964a, 25). That which rationally promotes life is 
good, and that which is destructive is not. The standard is man’s life qua man 
(1964a). J. Charles King claims Rand does not prove that life is the ultimate 
value, or that man’s life is the “standard of value for all men” (King 1986, 111). 
Life, he says, is an instrumental value; it is a means to another value or other 
values (King 1986, 111). 
Life—The Ultimate Value 
To Rand, the ultimate value is man’s whole life. This is the teleological 
element of Rand’s ethics. Man cannot live “on the range of the moment, like 
an animal” (Rand 1964a, 24). This quote seems to imply a lower-level being 
has no ultimate value. By that I mean it does not strive for its maximum 
potential lifespan as its ultimate end. Animals survive from moment to 
moment or from season to season, but not with their “whole life” in mind, 
because unlike man, they do not have a conception of their “whole life” or 
potential lifespan (Rand 1964a, 24). Lower-level animals live “as if” they face a 
probability of dying from moment to moment but not “as if” life were 
ultimately finite. Life for them is contingent, but it is only contingent—at least, 
this idea is consistent with their behavior as described in Rand’s quote.8 
According to Merriam-Webster, contingent means “likely but not certain 
to happen.” But, of course, this is not true forever. At some point, life is certain 
not to happen. Life is not only contingent; it is finite. And, unlike other 
creatures, man is aware of life’s finality. He is aware of his potential length of 
life. If man were a being that faced only the probability of dying but had the 
potential of living forever, then life would be an instrumental value but not 
necessarily an ultimate value. However, man does face a finite end. He is 
mortal. Death is a certainty. At each moment in life he faces a probability of 
living or dying, and therefore he must continually make the choice to live; but 
life is not only contingent, it is finite; thus he does so knowing that ultimately 
there is an end. 
                                                          
8 Rand does clarify that nonsentient beings do not purposively act with life as their 
goal but do so automatically (1964a, 16n). 
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Although Rand did not explicitly mention the finality of life as a factor 
in life being the ultimate value, it is implicit in her discussion of the lifespan as 
the context against which man’s goals are assessed. According to Peikoff, man 
has the capacity to think long-range and should do so. The idea of a living 
being’s “range of thinking” is dependent on its level of cognitive ability. A 
being with a lower level of consciousness than man “cannot grasp or deal with 
the total of his lifespan and does not need to so do so” (1991, 216). Man is 
unlike other creatures in this regard: 
The temporal scale of man’s concern must be… his entire lifespan. 
Just as man’s knowledge must be integrated into an all-encompassing 
sum, so must his actions. “If he is to succeed at the task of survival… 
man has to choose his course, his goals, his values in the context and 
terms of a lifetime.” (Peikoff 1991, 217; quotation from Rand 1964a, 
24) 
Peikoff continues: 
[Man] must know the survival significance of every action he takes. 
And he must know it in relation to the timespan of an entire human 
life. (1991, 217) 
In those cultures in which there is a great deal of freedom of choice in 
how lives are led, decisions tend to be made within a context of a life plan, 
which is revisited and revised over the course of a life. An individual has an 
idea of how much formal education he plans or hopes to have and 
approximately how long it will take; what kind of work he envisions pursuing; 
and when he would like to buy a house, start a family, and retire. These may be 
vague notions early on that tend to gain more clarity over time. 
Economists tend to focus on the monetary aspect of a person’s lifetime 
profile—for instance, on a person’s human capital (the discounted value of a 
person’s expected future earnings). Human-capital investment considerations 
involve expenditures on education (both implicit and explicit) relative to 
expected (discounted) lifetime earnings. Quality-of-life issues that do not have 
an explicit monetary value can be assigned a monetary equivalent and included 
in the (present) value of human capital. Even with nonmonetary considerations 
included, the concept of human capital is too narrow to take account of the 
“value” of a person’s life. 
From an ethical perspective, not only “what” is valued, but “how” it is 
acquired is of relevance. In OE, ethics are life preserving. Actions that are life 
sustaining in the long-term are “right.” Actions that are not life affirming if 
consistently pursued are not. Thus, one measure of “success” is a person’s 
expected lifespan. Because virtuous actions are life affirming, it would be 
anticipated that a virtuous person would have a longer expected lifespan than 
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one who is less virtuous (other things equal). To put this in context, there must 
be some measure against which the expected lifespan can be assessed— a 
“potential” lifespan. The potential lifespan may differ from person to person. 
It could be based on the longest lifespan ever attained by a human, for instance. 
Or it may be based on one’s personal heredity—say, the average longevity of 
recently deceased family members. 
By way of analogy, one could think of a piece of music as having a 
potential life to a musician. One objective of the musician is to make it to the 
end of the piece—which I will call time T. Time T is the time at which the 
piece, in effect, “dies.” T is its potential life. If the musician has a “fatal error” 
before the end of the piece, this would be analogous to an “early death.” The 
musician would prefer to play the piece as well as he can (ideally, with no errors) 
and to make it to the end. In playing, the musician is interested in how well he 
is doing throughout, with the objective of playing it to the end. The end, 
“death,” is not an objective or a goal. The objective is to “keep the piece alive” 
until T. Making it to the end is one measure of success, but not the only 
measure. Doing so with as few errors as possible is another. Playing the piece 
completely and beautifully is the ultimate goal. 
If, as Rand and Peikoff suggest, man is to consider his goals in relation 
to his lifespan, then one way of approaching this is to assess one’s expected life 
against his potential life. This is simplistic, to be sure. It may be regarded as a 
first approximation to “success” that can be modified by considering additional 
complexities that may be relevant. 
In calculating the expected life, it is necessary to have an idea of the 
potential lifespan, T, as well as probabilities related to early death. Frequently 
considered are two components of mortality (of humans): senescence, which 
is death due to biological aging; and nonsenescent death, which is attributed to 
“accidents.” (These terms overlap with but are different from two other terms 
biologists use to categorize causes of death: intrinsic and extrinsic [Bongaarts 
2005, 204]). Benjamin Gompertz is credited with being the first to arrive at a 
formula for the force of mortality (the rate of change in the survival function) 
as equaling the sum of two terms that reflect “accidental death” and death due 
to “aging.” Gompertz’s equation assumed the accidental death rate remained 
constant with respect to age, and assumed death due to aging as increasing 
geometrically with age (Kurtz 1930, 112). A number of studies have examined 
and further refined/altered Gompertz’s law of mortality (Cox 1959; Vaupel 
1986; Carnes, Olshansky, and Grahn 1996; Bongaarts 2005). 
For simplicity, the only cause of early mortality considered in this paper 
is death due to “accidents.” Accidents can fall into two broad categories, those 
that are avoidable and those that are not. Those that are avoidable have ethical 
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significance, particularly in OE. If a being does not succumb to early death by 
accident, he may have a finite life and die at time T. 
Unlike other beings, man is aware he will die and is aware of the potential 
length of his life. Life is a potential whole, and it is the whole of one’s potential 
life that is the value. If life were merely contingent (that is, probable) but not 
finite, then there could be “a series of means going off into an infinite 
progression toward a nonexistent end” (Rand 1964a, 17). As Rand points out, 
this is “a metaphysical and epistemological impossibility” (Rand 1964a, 17). 
The reason this is impossible is because infinity is a metaphysical and 
epistemological impossibility for man; it is impossible because life is finite—
not because life is contingent. Even though the idea of a contingent but 
potentially immortal life is impossible, it is still useful to imagine such an 
existence in order to separate the two—life’s contingency and its finality—in 
order to identify why life for man can be an instrumental value as well as an 
ultimate value. If life were contingent but potentially unending, life would still 
be the fundamental value and it would serve as an instrumental value, but there 
might be no need for an ultimate value because there would be no ultimate end 
(of life). 
Numerical Example 
I pose the following numerical example to illustrate why life would be 
the ultimate value for a being with a finite and contingent life, but not the 
ultimate value for a being that had an infinite and contingent life. Suppose a 
“being,” B∞, faces a probability of dying each year of 10 percent. However, if 
the being does not die an “early death” he could live forever, in that he faces a 
potentially eternal life. The expected or average life for B∞ (based on the 
present value formula) would be PV∞= 1/.10 = 10 years. 
Now consider another being, B10, who faces the same probability of 
“early death,” but if he does not die before his time he will live to be 10 years 
old (T=10). The expected life of this being would be PV10 = 6.144 years. This 
is given by the formula ∑1T [1/(1+r)]t = ∑110 [1/(1.10)]t = 6.144. (This is the 
discrete formula. The continuous counterpart is ∫0T e-rt dt, where r in the discrete 
version is not equal in value to r in the continuous equation.) 
Even though B∞ could potentially live forever, his expected life is 10 
years. B10, who has a maximum lifespan of 10 years, has an expected life of 
6.144 years. There are a number of assumptions in this example. One is that 
each year, which is given the value of 1, is multiplied by the probability of 
survival, which given by the formula, 1/(1+r)t, where t is the given year and r 
is the force of mortality (i.e., the probability of dying). The force of mortality 
is assumed to be 10 percent both for B∞ and for B10. It is also held constant, 
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which reflects independence between the cause(s) of early death and age (time) 
(Touchstone 2014, 81; Knight 2004, 1340). The average or expected age 
employs the same equation as the one for the present value of an income 
stream of one unit (e.g., dollar) per year discounted at rate r; that is, the 
expected age is the sum of the survival rates for years one through T, or ∑1T 
[1/(1+r)t]. This equation is consistent with the general form of the definition 
of the “average life” of an asset given by Preinreich (1938) and by Kurtz (1930) 
(Touchstone 2014, 86). 
Consider now the effect of virtue on the expected lifespan. Virtues have 
been defined as actions to gain or keep values, one’s life being the fundamental 
value as well as an instrumental value at the very least. If virtues maintain and 
preserve one’s life, then it would follow virtues would tend to extend the length 
of one’s life. Rand’s (1964a, 25) cardinal virtues are rationality, productive 
work, and pride. Productive work—“making a living”—sustains one’s 
existence. Not all virtues necessarily result in a longer average life. Some tend 
to promote the quality of life more than its quantity. Life qua man is not limited 
to maximizing one’s expected life. However, for purposes of illustration, I will 
confine my analysis to virtues with the effect of promoting or lengthening the 
average life. 
Suppose the beings, B∞ and B10, both choose to follow a more virtuous 
course of existence. This would be expected to reduce the probability of early 
death (other things equal). There may be other factors that could affect the 
early-death rate, but if the focus is simply on this aspect of the early-death rate, 
the question is, how would this affect the expected length of life of the two 
beings under consideration? A lower probability of early death, r, would result 
in a longer average life. Virtue pays for both beings by extending their average 
lengths of life. 
For example, for B∞, for early-death probabilities, r, of .20, .12, .10, and 
.01, the expected lengths of life would be 5, 8.33, 10, and 100 years, 
respectively. For B10, the same early-death probabilities would give the 
following expected lengths of life: 4.19, 5.65, 6.144, and 9.47, respectively. The 
improvements in the average lengths of life are less dramatic for B10 than for 
B∞ for changes in the early-death rate. Expressed in absolute terms, B∞’s 
expected length of life shows more improvement than for B10 with a fall in the 
early-death rate. In relative terms the expected life as a percentage of the 
potential lifespan for B10 is 41.93 percent, 56.50 percent, 61.44 percent, and 
94.71 percent for the respective probabilities of early death of .20, .12, .10, and 
.01. For B∞, the percentages are incalculable (undefined) because the expected 
life is divided by infinity. Even for an early-death rate of 1 percent and an 
average length of life of 100 years for B∞, the average life expressed as a 
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percentage of infinity is zero as t tends to infinity.9 In relative terms virtue has 
more significance for the being with the finite life than for one with an infinite 
(potentially endless) life (other things equal), since for the latter the ratio is 
undefined. 
This cursory examination illustrates that even though both beings, B10 
and B∞, would face a finite expected life (in present value terms), the “whole 
life” (maximum potential age) would be of more relevance to B10 than to B∞ 
given an improvement in r. This is revealed by the improvement in the ratio of 
the expected length of life to the total potential lifespan for B10 with a reduction 
in the early-death probability. For B∞, this ratio is meaningless since regardless 
of how large his expected length of life is, it is undefined relative to infinity. A 
more virtuous life (resulting in a lower probability of early death) has 
“meaning” to B∞ in that it can have a dramatic impact on the expected length 
of life. For B10, there are improvements as well, but unlike B∞, the 
improvements can be gauged relative to his potential “whole” lifespan. B10’s 
“whole life” is not just a basis for measuring “how well he is doing” (as a 
standard of value); it is an end toward which his actions can be directed. A 
more virtuous life does not simply keep him alive moment to moment; it 
lengthens his expected life. However, unlike the being with an infinite life, this 
longer expected life can be measured against his potential lifespan, and his 
potential lifespan is a goal toward which actions can be directed. The longer 
expected life for B10 is given context by having a finite life against which it can 
be gauged. The potential lifespan, when finite, serves as a goal toward which 
the person can strive by acting more virtuously, thereby reducing the early 
probability of dying and increasing his expected length of life. 
Life: The Ultimate Value for a Being with an Indefinite Lifespan 
Economists see decisions as being made at the margin. Lives are lived 
from one moment to the next. However, decisions are made and lives are lived 
within a context. That context is (not necessarily) marginal. For instance, goals 
are not incremental. They are “whole.” They may be achieved incrementally, 
and decisions related to goals may be made at the margin, but the goal itself is 
not incremental; it is “whole.” Incremental decisions are often made within a 
context of a “whole.” This is one way in which Rand and Peikoff view life 
decisions, as being made within the context of one’s whole lifespan. 
                                                          
9 The present value (expected lifespan) is defined as: 
PV0 = ∫0 T e-rt dt = (1/r) (1 – e-rT) [see Chiang 1974, 457] 
Further, lim T→∞ [(1/r) (1 – e-rT)]/T is by L’Ho ̂pital’s rule equal to lim T→∞ e-rT/1 = 0. 
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Decisions made on the basis of information that appears to be 
incremental are often relative to a “whole”; for example, death rates are 
established on the basis of a population, and rates of return are established on 
the basis of the value of an asset. Rates of interest or of decay in isolation are 
of interest, but the effect of compounding or of discounting on future values 
or on present values of assets can be dramatic and is also of interest. An 
investor does not simply compare expected rates of return when making a 
decision; he also is interested in net capital values. Similarly, in making life 
decisions, a person would be interested not only in probabilities of dying but 
also in their effects on the expected length of life. 
In turn, a given expected lifespan can be related to a potential lifespan. 
The whole of an expected life expressed in years can be assessed against a 
potential lifespan. A potentially unending life is not quantifiable. It seems 
ethical decisions as they relate to an expected lifespan relative to a potentially 
unending one would be problematic. “Lifetime goals” would appear to have 
no context if there were no potential lifespan against which to assess them. In 
this sense “life” may not be the ultimate value if life is potentially unending. 
Life in the sense of staying alive may still be a value, but “life” may not be the 
ultimate value or the only ultimate value—at least, not in the sense in which it 
serves as a basis against which to measure an “expected” lifespan, since the 
concept of an infinite (indefinite) life as a “whole” is not meaningful. 
Stolyarov states: 
While man’s mind cannot envision infinite size or infinite smallness, 
it can conceive of the possibility of “infinite” longevity of anything: 
buildings, planets, animals, men—so long as these entities had a 
certain origin in time. 
This phenomenon can be referred to as a chronological infinity, though I 
use this term with reservation, because it does not truly describe an 
infinity, for all the measurements concerning it must be in all cases 
finite. (2013, 77–78) 
This is an important point. Man can and often does think of himself as 
a being that will “be” indefinitely or endlessly. Man can comprehend aging, 
because he experiences it, but death of one’s self is not quite comprehensible. 
Still his time horizon is such that man tends to place more value on today 
rather than later, which is termed “time preference.” Man tends to discount 
more heavily that which is to be experienced in the future than things 
experienced today. In part, this may be because man faces a probability of early 
death, and it may also be because he will ultimately die. However, these are not 
considered the sole determinants of time preference (Frederick, Loewenstein, 
and O’Donoghue 2002). For instance, other risks or uncertainties might be 
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sufficient for time preference to exist, even if death did not. The effect of time 
preference is to reduce the present value of a stream of income for a given 
asset relative to the present value of an asset for which the rate of time 
preference is zero, in the same way an early-death rate shortens the expected 
life for a person relative to a life expectancy for which it is assumed there is no 
probability of early death. 
As for a being with an indefinite lifespan but who faces early death, his 
time horizon will depend in part on which early-death rate he faces. As has 
been seen, a higher early-death rate is associated with a shorter expected life. 
To the extent more or less virtuous courses of action are associated with lower 
or higher early-death rates, life choices that are more or less virtuous will be 
associated with longer or shorter expected lifespans. For a given expected 
lifespan, the possibility of a longer expected lifespan by which it can be assessed 
may be sufficient to establish “life” as the ultimate value. 
That is, it could be argued life may still serve as the ultimate value for a 
being with a potentially unending life based on the following reasoning. Given 
the possibility of a potentially endless lifespan with the possibility of early 
death, various early-death rates would be associated with different life choices. 
Thus, an expected lifespan associated with a particular early-death rate could 
be judged relative to one with a lower early-death rate. For instance, the 
expected lifespan for an entity B∞ that faces an early-death rate of 10 percent 
is 10 years (under the assumptions given above); for an early-death rate of 1 
percent, it is 100 years. So even though a potential maximum T would not exist 
for B∞, there would be an expected lifespan with a lower early-death rate 
against which life decisions as reflected in an expected lifespan for a higher 
death rate could be compared. 
The “expected lifespans” discussed above serve as illustrations. For an 
individual, all that may be necessary to put his “life goals” in context may be 
that for the associated expected lifespan there is another, longer expected 
lifespan associated with a lower probability of early death against which it can 
be assessed. The examples considered above are also “hollow” in that the 
content of life is absent. 
The Indestructible Entity Revisited 
Rand and Peikoff have argued that for an “indestructible” entity, life 
would not be a value since the entity could not lose it. A value is that which a 
being acts to gain or keep. Since it would be unnecessary for an indestructible 
being to act to keep its life, the being would be inert. There would be no reason 
for it to undertake any action if the ultimate value (which is “life” for mortal 
beings) cannot be lost. 
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For an “indestructible” entity that cannot die, I previously argued, 
inactivity may not be sustainable because of actions undertaken to relieve 
boredom (provided the entity has some of the cognitive make-up of man). 
However, not just any action to relieve boredom would qualify as a “value” (in 
the ethical sense).10 What distinguishes actions undertaken for the sake of some 
random or ill-defined “experience” from actions undertaken to attain a value 
is the latter are purposeful; there is a goal toward which the action is 
consciously directed. To qualify as a goal, there must be the possibility of 
success or failure. Thus, to have values, the indestructible entity must be 
capable of error and error correction, and it must have the mental and 
emotional make-up to care about the outcome of its actions (whether it has 
succeeded or failed). Life per se may not be an ultimate value or even a value 
at all to the indestructible being, but achievement of perfection or 
“betterment” may be. There may be no single overarching purpose in “life” as 
there might be for a mortal, but there may be a number of goals (values) the 
entity would care about achieving. 
For instance, the entity may have as a goal playing a piece of music with 
no (or very few) errors. Such a goal would require practice if the piece of music 
is challenging (difficult to play) and the entity is capable of errors and of 
developing error-reduction (skill) with practice. In other words, there is a risk 
involved in playing the piece (a probability of error), and the objective of the 
entity is to gain skills (with practice) so as to reduce the risk of error to very 
low (or zero). 
Goals such as this have a time dimension. There is a time dimension 
associated with the piece of music itself. Immortal beings may have different 
durations associated with artistic pursuits (such as musical pieces) or 
recreations (such as games) than mortals. However, since the beings are 
assumed to be capable of boredom, such pursuits would still be of finite 
duration (Touchstone 1993, 23). There is also a time dimension associated with 
that which would be necessary to achieve the goal. The time necessary to 
achieve a goal may be finite or it may be open-ended. An indestructible being 
could have countless goals. With each goal would be a probability of failure as 
                                                          
10 See Peikoff on the distinction between goal and purpose (1991, 190–91). Peikoff’s 
point is that for a “goal,” there must be success or failure (life or death). For a “purpose,” 
there must be conscious choice. I am saying that to be a value in the ethical sense (for an 
indestructible entity), pursuit of the goal must be associated with the possibility of success 
or failure (which is specific to the goal) and the being must care about the outcome of the 
pursuit of the value (whether he succeeds or fails at attaining it). 
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well as the capability of reducing that risk through the improvement of skills 
over time.11 
Life qua Man 
Does Rand’s idea of “life qua man” mean the ultimate goal is to maximize 
one’s lifespan? Should a person avoid risks at all costs, shun anything or anyone 
that might endanger his life? Although, according to Mack (1986, 139), there 
may be some who hold that maximizing one’s lifespan is not the objective. In 
the calculation of an expected lifespan it is assumed, to borrow from Gertrude 
Stein, a year is a year is a year, but, to paraphrase a quote attributed to Edward 
J. Stieglitz (Stieglitz n.d.): it’s not the years in your life so much as the life in 
your years. The years in this example are simply “placeholders” that could be 
thought to represent “mere survival.” Employing the concept of human 
capital, economists fill in the blank years with explicit monetary income as well 
as (at times) psychic income. Psychic income reflects values that give meaning 
to a person’s life and to which a monetary value can be imputed but to which 
no explicit monetary value is attached.12 Ethicists approach the values of life, 
not in monetary terms, but conceptually. In the previous example, two values 
that were relevant were reason and productive purpose. Objectivists start and 
end (the analysis) with life—life is fundamental and ultimate—but “life” must 
be given “content” from the ethicist’s perspective. 
In order to have a better idea of what a “good life” might comprise, it is 
helpful to have an idea of what actions are required to attain it. This is the 
approach of rule utilitarians. They examine the existing ethical principles of 
society. This does not mean a good life is synonymous with being good or 
acting right. A good life is not simply a virtuous life. A virtuous life is necessary 
if one wants to achieve the “good life” because virtues are the actions taken to 
gain or keep values. 
Where to Look for the Rules 
Those who subscribe to an evolutionary theory of morality, such as 
Hayek, Hazlitt, and Yeager, advocate following society’s rules. The rules can 
                                                          
11 A broader and more basic meaning associated with “success” may apply: the 
acknowledgment or recognition of a value through the acquisition of knowledge or 
discovery. “Success” would then be recognition of the value as a value. Achievement of a 
value typically presupposes the identification of a value as a value, but an achievement also 
can be the discovery of the value. 
12 In addition, the discount rate used in calculating the present value of lifetime income 
would typically take into account more than the risk of early death. 
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be assessed by checking to see whether those who follow the rules are 
successful. If one looks at the current society and asks what actions ultimately 
lead to success, the actions will be determined in part by how much freedom a 
person has to think, decide, and act on his decisions. In a feudal system, a 
person’s station in life is for the most part predetermined. If one’s father is a 
serf, one will be a serf. The range of choice in terms of occupation, where one 
lives, or whom (or whether) one marries is severely restricted if not 
nonexistent. This social structure constrains many of the decisions a person 
makes throughout his life. 
Does this mean morals are relative to time and place? Or are there 
absolute principles? Rand has argued that because man’s rational faculty is 
volitional, he must be free to exercise it. Man is neither omniscient nor infallible 
(Rand 1967, 17). There are certain preconditions that are suitable for man 
(1964c, 93–94; 1964b, 108). These preconditions need to be in place in order 
for man to be free to discover which actions are successful and to act on them. 
These “preconditions” form the basis for a legal system on which a political 
structure is based, and which sets up a zone in which humans may flourish (live 
in accordance with virtue) (Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991, 115). 
These preconditions may not be present in current society; therefore the 
conclusions that might be drawn from observing existing social norms could 
be flawed. If a person were to observe existing society and its norms, he might 
discover what appears to “work” in this time and place, but these norms may 
not be successful long-term; they may not be consistent with man’s nature if 
survival qua man is his objective. In fact, epistemologically, it is necessary to 
first establish a code of ethics to provide the foundation on which to base these 
societal preconditions. 
That is, it is necessary to develop a code of ethics before there is an 
understanding of what pre-conditions must exist in order for those principles 
to result in long-run success. If those preconditions are not in place 
existentially, using the method of observing rules that appear to lead to success 
will very likely lead to erroneous conclusions. Without this code of ethics being 
established epistemologically, the preconditions cannot be discovered. How 
then can a code of ethics be discovered independently of examining existing 
society? 
Crusoe Approach 
Rather than examining existing society to uncover moral standards, an 
alternative approach to discovering ethical principles is to employ the so-called 
Crusoe device or desert-island approach. The Crusoe approach is often used 
among Austrian economists like Rothbard and has been defended from 
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detractors by Mises ([1949] 1996, 205). Hazlitt makes the point that its use 
should be more widespread to include ethics: 
Ethics would be in a more advanced stage than it is if moral 
philosophers had begun more often with the postulate of the isolated 
individual and then moved, for many problems, to the postulate of a 
society of two, three, etc. before jumping immediately to The Great 
Society. (1999, 380n13) 
I have suggested elsewhere that although Rand did not use the “Crusoe” 
approach, she did refer to man alone on a desert island in deriving the cardinal 
values and virtues of OE (Touchstone 2006, 89; Rand 1964a, 32; Rand 1964b, 
107). To Rand, the primary value is reason and the central value is productive 
purpose, with the corresponding virtues of rationality and productive work. 
Rand’s third and final cardinal value is self-esteem. The corresponding cardinal 
virtue is pride (Rand, 1964a, 25). Self-esteem is a function of man’s 
acknowledgment of his efficacy and self-worth. It is also the connection to 
happiness: an indication man is worthy of it (Rand 1961, 128). The cardinal 
values and virtues identified when man is alone do not change once man is 
among other men (Peikoff 1991, 252). 
Rand’s primary social principle is that a person’s life is an end in itself. 
Because life is the ultimate value for each person, every person is an end in 
himself. Rand means no man is the means to the end for another or others 
(Rand 1964a, 27). The trader principle is the central social value in OE; because 
each man is an end in himself, the only appropriate interaction among men is 
voluntary interaction. The corresponding central social virtue is justice (1964a, 
31). The trader principle is the exchange of value for value and applies to all 
forms of human interaction—in communication with others as well as in the 
realms of friendship, love, and economics. 
In The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard employs the Crusoe device, first 
examining Crusoe alone. Crusoe owns himself (Rothbard 1998, 31). He comes 
to own property by using and transforming resources (1998, 34). Rothbard 
regards self-ownership and first-use (homesteading) ownership as axiomatic 
(Younkins 2005, 365; Yeager 2001, 215, 277, 278). Unlike Rand, who segues 
immediately from man alone to man in society, Rothbard retains the island 
abstraction, adding a second castaway, Friday, to the island. 
Rothbard begins his discussion with the gains from trade upon Friday’s 
arrival on the island already inhabited by Crusoe (1998, 35). Gains are realized 
when trading partners specialize in those goods in which each has a 
comparative advantage. In fact, gains from trade can be realized so long as each 
party to an exchange values that which he receives more than that which is 
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forgone; there need not be “more” in the physical sense—more goods—but 
more in a value (utility) sense. 
Rothbard argues the nonaggression principle precedes and forms the 
basis for individual ethics (Younkins 2005, 365). This is the opposite of Rand, 
who develops her cardinal values before establishing the principle of 
nonaggression. Although this is a major difference between Rand and 
Rothbard, Rothbard claimed he was in basic agreement with Objectivism 
(Branden 1986, 413; Sciabarra and Sechrest 2005, 243). 
Gains from Trade 
As previously mentioned, when Rothbard introduces Friday to the island 
already inhabited by Crusoe, he starts by discussing gains from trade (Rothbard 
1998, 35). Two parties to an interaction can achieve more than “the sum of the 
parts.” There can be gains in productivity that follow from economic exchange; 
in knowledge via communication; in friendship and love through social 
interaction; and in children through reproduction. The last in the list is typically 
not explicitly mentioned in the literature. It is true these gains can be realized. 
One and one can add up to more than two, but it is also the case that none of 
these possibilities can be known before the fact—before interaction takes 
place. 
It took a very long time for the positive-sum nature of interaction to be 
discovered. Even now, there are those who see trade and other forms of 
human interaction as largely zero sum or even negative sum. Because the cause 
of reproduction has its effect only after several months, it took some time for 
humans to understand the concept of paternity. Mutual benefits from 
exchange and/or interaction are not obvious before the fact. If mutual gains 
to cooperation were self-evident, this would provide a strong inducement for 
Crusoe and Friday to cooperate. Since they are not, Crusoe and Friday may 
engage in alternative interaction possibilities. 
Noninterference Principle 
If, as ethical evolutionists suggest, current mores should set the standard 
for moral principles, then it might be concluded killing other men is wrong 
except in self-defense—at least it is in many cultures. Even killing other 
creatures is often considered wrong if it is gratuitous. However, men do kill 
nonhumans for various reasons, and if nature sans man is used as the guide, 
“not killing” is not the rule. Without the presence of other men, Crusoe may 
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have only nature on which to rely for guidance.13 Nature is rife with killing— 
and not solely in self-defense. 
On a desert island, once Crusoe is faced with the presence of another 
man, he may feel threatened. However, he may reason in this way: “I value my 
life. If Friday is like I am (since he is also a human being), he also values his 
life. We can both preserve our lives if we respect each other’s lives.” Here 
Crusoe would be searching for some principle—an action (or inaction in this 
case) that applies not only to himself but to human beings generally. 
Man tends to think abstractly and to seek rules or principles. But the 
reasoning above does not always lead to a generally valid principle. Suppose 
Crusoe is attracted to Friday. He could reason that he is attracted to Friday and 
would like for certain physical actions to take place with Friday; then by 
generalizing those feelings, he would conclude Friday must feel the same way 
about him. Establishing this as a principle, he would feel justified in acting on 
those feelings. This is not exactly a case of “do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you.” The Golden Rule does not necessarily mean any action (or 
inaction) you would have another do (not do) to you, you would do (not do) 
to him. The Golden Rule does not necessarily imply you would generalize from 
yourself to humanity for every feeling you have. Crusoe’s thinking involves 
arriving at a generalization from oneself to others because one’s self is the only 
source of data one has on which to depend. There are no other humans to 
observe except oneself, so one’s self serves as the basis for abstraction to 
humans in general once another human arrives on the scene. Crusoe uses as 
data his own feelings. Since Friday is the only other person, the generalization 
is from one’s own feelings to Friday. However, one’s own feelings are a weak 
basis for generalization. 
Instead of generalizing from himself to others on the basis of his feelings, 
Crusoe may observe “nature sans man”—the animal kingdom. He might infer 
the “law of the jungle” is “to kill or be killed.” He could generalize this “law” 
and assume Friday holds it as well since, being human, he would make the same 
observation about nature. If this were the case, then I propose Crusoe may 
weigh his alternatives as follows: 
I can either kill Friday or not take any action to kill Friday. If I choose to 
kill Friday, then I face two alternatives: I may live or I may die. Since I have no 
other information on which to base the probabilities, I will assume my chances 
of living or dying are 50/50. If I choose not to kill Friday, I face two 
                                                          
13 Crusoe is assumed to have amnesia (Rothbard 1998, 29). Thus, to the extent he may 
have been exposed to principles, such as rights, in his previous life, he does not bring those 
with him to the island. 
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possibilities: he will also choose not to kill me, or he will choose to kill me. 
Since I have no other information on which to base the probabilities of these 
two alternatives, I will assume the probability he will choose to try to kill me is 
50 percent. If he chooses this alternative, then the probability he will kill me is 
50 percent. Thus, if I choose to act to kill Friday, the probability I will die is 50 
percent. If I choose not to kill Friday, the probability I will die is 25 percent. 
The better choice is for me to decide not to initiate action to kill Friday since 
that alternative offers me a better chance of survival. If Friday reasons the same 
way as I do and also values his life, then the chances of dying by Friday’s hand 
are reduced even further. 
The asymmetry between the decisions faced by the two castaways exists 
because Crusoe has more information about himself than he does about Friday 
(see, for instance, Salvatore 1996, 564.) The assumption of 50/50 for two 
outcomes when there is no other information is common. That this 
assumption may be flawed is irrelevant because humans are capable of flawed 
logic and typically have imperfect information on which to make decisions. 
This is illustrative of one possible scenario Crusoe might envision. Under the 
circumstances I think it is a reasonable one. 
I am assuming in the above analysis that if the two castaways fight, it is 
to the death.14 In other words, the death of the other is the objective of each. 
It may be the person who initiates the action has a tactical advantage and faces 
a higher probability of success, but the assumption of 50/50 is typical when 
there are two outcomes to an action and there is no other information on which 
to base probabilities. This, of course, is not the only scenario Crusoe might 
pursue, but it does favor, if not cooperation, at least a standoff in the initiation 
of violence—a calculated respect for the personal space of the other person 
having its basis in the value of one’s own life. It lends support to the 
noninterference principle insofar as one’s person is concerned. 
 
 
                                                          
14 I have purposely kept the scenario simplistic and confined the alternatives to “Kill” 
and “Not Kill.” The broader alternatives of “Attack” and “Not Attack” would require a 
more complex diagram taking into account counterattack/not counterattack possibilities in 
the event a person was not killed, with associated probabilities. Also to be taken into 
account would be various possible injuries the attacked person and/or aggressor might 
sustain if they survived, and how the respective parties would respond to those injuries (as 
well as the relevant probabilities associated with those outcomes). These are interesting 
alternatives but are beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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Theft in a State of Nature 
Respecting Friday’s person does not necessarily extend to a respect for 
his property. For that, both men must have at least some nascent concept of 
ownership; otherwise, there may be an (apparent) incentive for one to steal 
from the other. This would be the case particularly if and when property is left 
unguarded. However, detection of a “cheater” is fairly easy in a two-man 
environment. If, say, Friday’s property is taken by Crusoe, then Friday is 
entitled to retaliate. Here again, Friday must have at least a rudimentary notion 
of the concept of retaliation, and he must also act on it. Action may take the 
form of trying to convey the concept of ownership to Crusoe, but if Crusoe 
continues to take Friday’s property, Friday must respond by either threatening 
the use of physical force or, if that fails, using physical force against Crusoe. If 
Crusoe faces the threat of a physical response from Friday, this can be a 
disincentive to steal and the beginning of a respect not only for Friday’s person 
but also for his property. 
Lacking a fully formed concept of ownership, Crusoe may not steal from 
Friday and/or Friday may not steal Crusoe’s property because of mutual fear 
of physical reprisal. If they choose to voluntarily interact, then mutual gains 
may result (not just in terms of total goods but in terms of nontangible benefits 
as well), and that can form an incentive for the respect for property. The 
incentive of mutual benefits can bolster an already-existing disincentive—the 
fear of a physical response. 
Two Men or More 
Because there are mutual gains to trade (broadly defined to include other 
voluntary social interaction), these provide strong incentives to engage in 
exchange. It pays to be honest. However, with more people, there may be 
“golden opportunities” to cheat because detection of violators can become 
more difficult as the number of people increases (Frank 1988, 73–74). 
However, the idea of golden opportunities is fallacious. Robert Frank has 
pointed out that individuals tend to signal their intentions via facial expressions 
and other bodily cues (1988, 114–33). Thus, if a person wants to appear to be 
honest, it pays to be honest. 
However, some individuals may succumb to apparent short-term gains 
and cheat because they have impulse-control problems (Frank 1988, 161–62). 
It has been shown that a tit-for-tat strategy can result in cooperation in a state 
of nature—without government (Axelrod 1984, 3; 20). A tit-for-tat strategy 
involves cooperating with those who cooperate with you and retaliating against 
those who cheat (1984, 53–54). Retaliation takes the form of refusal to engage 
with a defector in future “trades.” However, there are qualifications that apply. 
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One is that these results are based on the assumptions that “trade” is for small 
stakes and cheaters are identifiable. When violations are large—that is, 
significant infringement to life or property is involved—then refusal to engage 
in future interactions with the violator will be insufficient. Retaliation should 
be proportional. In a state of nature, the responsibility for retaliatory action 
will fall on the victim. The virtue of physical courage is required (Touchstone 
2006, 52–59; 2010, 5–6). 
If the victim was a coward or incapacitated as a result of the violation, 
he would not or could not take action against the violator. In addition, the 
violator’s identity might not be known, or even if it was known there might be 
extenuating circumstances. For instance, the violator might be insane, in which 
case proportional retribution might not be warranted. Instead, some form of 
nonpunitive institutionalization might be required. According to Rothbard, 
under anarchy private agencies would emerge to deal with rights infringement; 
but he does not rule out personal retribution (1998, 90–91). Like Mises, Rand 
is opposed to anarchy ([1949] 1996, 149). To Rand, retaliation would be the 
responsibility of government; the sole function of government should be 
protection of individuals’ negative rights (1964b, 108). Negative rights, 
according to both Rand and Rothbard, are primary. 
The desert-island scenarios considered above are cases in which there is 
one man or two men. I have argued elsewhere that positive rights are primary 
rights, in the sense of being the first rights in human development. This I 
illustrated in a two-man desert-island scenario in which neither person is a man. 
The case was what I have referred to as the Primary Social Unit (mother and 
child) (Touchstone 2010, 23–24; Touchstone 2006, 89–104). In addition to 
Rand’s cardinal values, nurturance is included. My case for limited government 
was based on the inability of children (and under some circumstances, adults 
with diminished capacity) to protect their rights in a state of anarchy when 
abandoned, abused, or killed by their rightful caregivers.15 I offered a corollary 
argument for the positive right to care for those who have been abandoned or 
abused by their caregivers in instances in which care is otherwise unavailable 
(Touchstone 2010, 25–27; Touchstone 2006, 133–38). 
                                                          
15 Interestingly, Mises recognized this dilemma under anarchy. He does not use 
abandoned and/or abused children as a basis for an argument for government insofar as 
protecting their rights is concerned. His case is that infants, the aged, and the insane pose a 
threat to the social order and therefore government force is needed to protect the majority from this 
threat ([1949] 1996, 149). 
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